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1. Introduction 
As in other countries, the debate in Britain on the future of welfare provision assumes a 
simple choice:  either the state must provide or individuals must meet their own needs.  It 
assumes a series of quite distinct problems affecting individuals and society:  
unemployment, ill-health, old age and so on.  Increasingly, even defenders of the 
‘Welfare State’ assume that the function of state provision is to meet the needs of the 
poorest, who cannot afford to provide for themselves, and that the majority, both middle 
class and those manual workers with secure employment, can insure commercially.  This 
paper seeks to contribute to debates on the future of welfare provision by presenting 
historical evidence from Britain which challenges all three assumptions. 
 The next section shows that the first large-scale systems for insuring against ill-health 
and unemployment were created neither by the state nor commercial companies but by 
mutual societies and trade unions.  The third section studies the relationship between 
sickness, old age, unemployment and strike action, arguing that they inevitably overlap 
and can only be distinguished within the rules of a particular system of welfare benefits.  
The fourth section uses this evidence to argue that any system which insures against loss 
of income through unemployment or progressively poorer general health in late middle 
age faces such large ‘moral hazards’ — not simply fraud — that it cannot be operated 
commercially.  A brief conclusion draws some lessons for today.  
2. Welfare provision in pre-1914 Britain 
The so-called ‘Old Poor Law’ operated under Elizabethan legislation and was 
relatively well-suited to the needs of a market-based agricultural economy.  The system 
was parish-based, funded from property taxes, and governed by a local elite who paid 
most of the taxes.  The main beneficiaries were landless labourers who, in grain-growing 
regions, could only expect to be fully employed at harvest time.  By collectively funding 
income support, the land-owners sustained a workforce without the inflexibility of hiring 
workers by the year.  However, this system was less suitable for a more diversified, 
mobile and urbanised economy:  some property owners had far less stake in maintaining a 
workforce than others;  the Settlement Laws, tying workers to the parish on which they 
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had a claim, inevitably fell into disuse;  it was far harder to distinguish the deserving and 
the undeserving poor in growing cities. 
The creation of the New Poor Law in 1834 had only a limited and delayed effect on the 
operation of the system on the ground, but reflected attempts to deal with the 
consequences of industrialisation.1  Parish provision was replaced by unions, each a 
substantial sub-county unit centred on a town, and each union was required to build a 
workhouse to house claimants under essentially penal conditions.  However, in many 
urban areas workhouse construction was delayed until the 1860s and then concentrated on 
providing for orphans and the sick.2  The bulk of expenditure was always on ‘Outdoor 
Relief’, meaning cash payments to applicants who remained in their homes, but the 
majority of these were the sick and the elderly, not the unemployed.  The real failure of 
the Poor Law was not its penal treatment of paupers but the narrowness of provision.  
Central government pressure, particularly intense in the 1870s, meant a steady decline in 
the numbers relieved so that by January 1909, a year of deep recession, c.20,600 able-
bodied men were relieved who were ‘in want of work’ and ‘in health’, far fewer than 
were being relieved by the trade unions discussed below.3 
Therefore the Poor Law remained quantitatively important only in rural areas, and 
particularly in the grain growing districts, which experienced severe depopulation in the 
agricultural depression of the 1880s.  For most of the urban population, the system could 
only be turned to in the direst emergencies:  in practice, most people fended for 
themselves without assistance from the state.  However, they did not do this through self-
help and self-reliance, at least as conventionally understood.   From the early eighteenth 
century, urban Britain developed a rich infrastructure of clubs and societies, and one of 
their main purposes was to provide for their members in hard times.  Here we need to be 
wary of the implicit functionalism of most institutional history:  in exploring associational 
culture, we must distinguish between the reason why a group of people chose to gather 
together, which was often social, alcoholic, and reflected the various sources of personal 
identity within society, and the various activities carried on through such a group once it 
existed. 
The main focii for such gatherings were public houses and, to a much lesser extent, 
coffee houses and similar.  Some groups defined themselves simply by locality, but others 
were based on religion, geographical origin, and particularly occupation.  For example, 
among early societies in Wigan, Lancashire, were the Amicable Female Society,4 and the 
Roman Catholic Society5 while the Union Society of Strangers described its members as 
‘being chiefly Strangers & living in Wigan or townships adjoining, at a distance from our 
respective settlements’.6  Many of the activities of these gatherings can only be guessed at 
— Adam Smith’s comment that ‘people of the same trade seldom meet together, even for 
merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public or 
in some contrivance to raise prices’ was made at this time,7 while in 1817 the government 
was advised by a correspondent to curb trade unions by ‘not allowing any publican to 
draw any ale for any person in his house after six o'clock in the evening’.8  However, one 
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well-documented facet of many such gatherings was a friendly society or box club to 
provide for sick members. 
  The workings of a box club were simple:  members paid their weekly contribution 
into the box, usually held by the landlord of the pub where they met, and if they fell sick 
their benefit was taken equally directly from the box.  Such societies were numerous but 
small, creating few records.    In 1801, Sir John Eden estimated there were 7,200 
registered and unregistered friendly societies, and if there was an average of c.90 
members, they included 648,000 of the English population;  another count in 1803 gave 
9,672 societies and 704,350 members in England and Wales.9  As discussed below, the 
finances of such bodies were unstable and the majority probably had only a brief 
existence, but during the early nineteenth century local clubs began to coalesce into the 
better known affiliated orders.  For example, the Manchester Unity of Oddfellows had 
nearly half a million members by 1875.10  By 1913, the societies had a total membership 
of 6.78 million and operated within the National Insurance system as ‘approved 
societies’.  They retained very large memberships through the inter-war period, but the 
Beveridge reforms of the 1940s saw a collapse in membership.11 
The affiliated orders provided for sickness and old age, but the only 19th century 
organisations making significant provision for economic distress were trade unions.  
Although we would today make a clear distinction between unions and friendly societies, 
in the pre-1825 period unions are generally identifiable only through their name and 
trade-based admission rules.  An extensive survey of the rulebooks of many such bodies 
from the late 18th and early 19th centuries preserved in the archives of the Registrar of 
Friendly Societies reveals a variety of experiments in providing for distress. 
Simply by being a gathering of workers with the same occupation, a trade society 
inevitably functioned as an informal labour market:  information about vacancies would 
be exchanged, and employers would know that the ‘house of call’ was a convenient place 
to find experienced workers;  often hiring was the responsibility of foremen who were 
themselves members of the society.  Further, visiting craftsmen travelling in search of 
work would know that the ‘house’ was a source of assistance.  Some early society 
rulebooks provide more formal mechanisms for finding work.  The most basic provision 
was to require members to notify the society of vacancies at their place of work;  of 
course, given the social role of box clubs this would have happened informally in any 
trade-based club but some societies provided for fines, denial of benefit, or even 
expulsion for members failing to notify vacancies.  Notified vacancies were then recorded 
in a book held at the house of call, going by various names:  the master’s book, the vacant 
book, or the Order book.  In some societies there was a strict requirement that the 
member who had been looking for work longest should have first refusal of a new 
vacancy, giving the union a large degree of control over the labour market.12 
Notifications of vacancies would help members find work within their own town but in 
many artisan trades vacancies could only be found by searching more widely.  
Consequently, local clubs tried to help their members travel elsewhere.  The simplest 
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provision was cash grants before departure;  for example, the Liverpool shipwrights in 
1794 ruled: 
26. That if any member ... shall happen to be discharged from his place of work upon 
honourable terms and cannot get employment ... within the Corporation of Liverpool 
... [he] shall be allowed and paid by the steward ... the sum of half a guinea to enable 
him to go to the next or such other place where the said trade of shipwrighting is 
carried out in order to get work.13 
However, this was only of initial assistance on what might be a long journey.  Travelling 
artisans could hope to get assistance from friends and relatives in other towns, but they 
would also call on members of their trade:  the house of call was an obvious source of 
both information about jobs and food and shelter.  Given the importance of craft loyalty, 
there was a long-standing tradition of assisting travelling fellow craftsmen, but this was 
vulnerable to fraud and, for the traveller, not entirely certain.  As a result, the rules of 
local clubs do contain attempts to establish more formal reciprocal links.14 
Once members of another society were to be treated just as if they were members of 
the local club, it was a small step to the creation of regional or national unions.  In the 
pre-1850 period, the main way in which such organisations provided for the unemployed 
was through tramping benefit, under which travelling members were paid, often by the 
mile, as they moved around a network.  The high mobility such a system promoted played 
a major role in extending the union as members found themselves in new towns, and 
therefore the tramping system has a central place in the development of British unionism.  
However, it declined in significance with the coming of the railways and for the sake of 
brevity I will concentrate on the development of direct financial assistance to the 
unemployed.15 
There is some evidence that this first developed in London, a large labour market 
where there was less point in travelling outside in search of work.  There is one example 
of a union trying to directly create work:  in 1816, a society of London smiths and 
ironworkers provided that unemployed members be employed making tools, models or 
other goods for sale or loan, after six days out of work.  However, the usual method was 
regular weekly payments on the model of sickness benefit.  One of the earliest unions to 
provide against economic distress established an unemployment insurance scheme on 
essentially modern lines.  In 1798, the Friendly Society of Tin Plate Workers, of Fleet 
Market London, included in their rules the following: 
7. That when any Free Member has notice of leaving his employment he shall give 
notice to the stewards of the time & cause of his Discharge ... who shall do their 
endeavour to hear of employ for him.  But if he or they do not hear of employ for 
him ... he shall go with one of the stewards the first Saturday night following & 
receive from the Treasurer such Benefit as shall belong to him during the time of his 
being out of Employ ... 
8. That every Member that is out of Employ & on the Box must call on the Steward that 
he first applyd. to for Relief, every day between the hours of ten in the morning & six 
in the evening & must answer such questions concerning trade as the Steward may 
propose to him, & for every days neglect shall forfeit a days pay. 
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17. That every member of this Society [who is fully paid-up] & it should be his 
misfortune to be out of employ — providing it is not his own fault he shall be 
allow’d eight shillings per week during the time he is out of employ ....16 
This contains all the essential elements of unemployment insurance:  a set rate of 
payment, a test based on availability for work, and a link to a system for finding work.  A 
limited number of other pre-1820 schemes have been located, some with interesting 
variants.  For example, a society of Liverpool builders in 1810 restricted benefit for those 
out of employ to the winter months,17 and the Southwark millwrights in 1820 limited it to 
‘between the 9th of November and the second Saturday in February’.18  A 
Wolverhampton society of Cabinet Lock and Key Makers in 1811 varied benefit 
according to the member’s family circumstances.19  After 1830, unemployment benefit 
would seem to have become more common in the metal trades, but remained rare in 
building or printing, industries less prone to severe unemployment.  The Manchester 
millwrights in 1836 were paying 10 shillings per week, but limited it to twelve weeks in a 
year, and provided for an advance of two weeks benefit to members going out of town to 
look for work;  this still appears to be a provision primarily for frictional and seasonal 
unemployment.20 
The economic crises of the 1840s, and particularly that of 1848 which was possibly the 
first to have a severe and simultaneous impact throughout the country, exposed the 
limitations of measures designed to cope with frictional and seasonal unemployment:  it 
was no longer possible to escape distress by moving to another town or just waiting a 
couple of months.  This created a need for large and well-funded systems of 
unemployment insurance, but few manual workers could afford this.  During the 1850s 
and 1860s, remarkably comprehensive welfare systems were developed by a small 
number of trade unions in the relatively well-paid engineering, building, and printing 
industries.  These typically had a weekly subscription of a shilling, in a period when 
unskilled labourers earned only around ten shillings (£0.50) a week while skilled 
engineers earned thirty to forty shillings (£1.50-2.00).  In return for this, the 
Amalgamated Society of Engineers was paying the following benefits to its members in 
the 1860s: 
— ten shillings per week for the first fourteen weeks of unemployment, and a lower rate 
indefinitely. 
— sixpence per night for travelling members;  this was a provision for ‘unfree’ 
probationary members ineligible for unemployment benefit.  Unemployed members 
sent to a vacancy were paid their fares by railway, coach or steamboat. 
— members losing their jobs for holding union office were paid the full rate of wages 
they had previously been receiving.  From 1871 onwards the union paid all members 
locked out or called out on strike a ‘contingent’ benefit, usually in addition to 
unemployment pay. 
— ten shillings per week for twenty-six weeks when sick, and then five shillings per 
week indefinitely. 
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— an emigration grant of six pounds, although this was hedged about with restrictions 
and may never actually have been paid. 
— a grant of £100 to members unable to follow their trade because of ‘losing a limb, or 
having one disabled by accident or otherwise, or through blindness, imperfect vision, 
apoplexy, epilepsy or paralysis’. 
— a ‘superannuation allowance’ of between seven and nine shillings per week, 
depending on how long they had been in the union;  this is further discussed below. 
— a ‘funeral allowance’ of £12 on the death of a member and £5 on the death of their 
wife. 
— discretionary benevolent grants from a separate fund, which would seem to have been 
the only provision for widows and orphans.21 
The ASE was the archetype, and its benefit system was probably both more 
comprehensive and better administered than any other union.  However, a number of 
other unions developed broadly similar schemes:  the Amalgamated Society of Carpenters 
and Joiners;  the Friendly Society of Ironfounders;  the London Society of Compositors.  
Although these unions were criticised both at the time, by the Royal Commission on 
Trade Unions of 1867-9, and subsequently by historians for operating an under-funded 
system of benefits, they were arguably the strongest unions industrially during the period 
and certainly grew and prospered.22  Their growth and prosperity are of course inter-
linked:  expansion meant a constant inflow of younger members and therefore the older 
members who were more likely to become entitled to benefits were a relatively small 
fraction of the membership. 
Until the 1880s and 1890s, trade unions outside the artisan trades seem not to have been 
able to afford extensive welfare benefits.  With rising working class incomes, coverage 
expanded rapidly in the 1890s and 1900s.  Figure 1 uses two comprehensive government 
surveys of the union movement in 1892 and 1908 to chart this process.  Of unionists 
eligible for conventional unemployment pay in 1892, 33% were in metals, 10% in 
building and 7% in printing;  in the metal trades, 75% of all unionists were eligible, as 
compared to 43% overall.  In mining and textiles, benefits were generally paid only when 
mines or factories closed due to disasters such as fires.  By 1908, the total number of 
workers receiving stationary relief had almost quadrupled so that 63% of all unionists, a  
total of 1,455,638, were eligible for benefit, although these were of course still only a 
relatively small part of the workforce.  As in 1892, the largest groups paying no benefit 
were among the unskilled, but elsewhere, provision had expanded in almost every sector, 
most notably in textiles.  In the traditional artisan trades, it would appear that almost all 
unions were offering unemployment pay of some form.23 
On this evidence, comprehensive welfare benefits were something which all groups of 
workers aspired to, and this aspiration arguably fuelled the growth of the union 
movement.  Precisely this period saw spectacular growth in total union membership, 
which rose from 2,485,000 in 1908 to 4,135,000 in 1913.  Although no surveys of union 
benefit provisions are available between 1908 and the start of the Great War, we can 
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reasonably assume that the proportion of unions offering benefits was probably 
expanding and certainly not contracting.  Assuming simply that the proportion remained 
constant, 2,440,000 trade unionists would have been provided with unemployment 
insurance by their own schemes at the end of 1913. 
This calculation is hypothetical, and ignores the changes brought about by the National 
Insurance Act of 1911.  This created the system of state benefits which survives in a 
recognisable form to the present day and was operated through a new network of labour 
exchanges managed by central government appointees.  Nevertheless, there were 
important continuities between the union schemes and National Insurance.  Firstly, the 
architects of unemployment insurance under the Act were the Board of Trade officials 
who had long had close contacts with the trade unions, and many of the details were 
borrowed from the ASE;  Beveridge later commented that ‘the only working model on a 
large scale was afforded by trade unions’.24  Secondly, the system created by the 1911 Act 
covered only a very limited group of trades:   building and construction;  shipbuilding;  
mechanical engineering;  ironfounding;  vehicle construction; and saw-milling.25  This is 
of course precisely the group of trades within which union schemes were longest 
established, and the Act did not so much extend the availability of unemployment 
insurance as remove the need to join a trade union to get it.  Consequently, only 
2,326,000 workers were actually covered by the National Insurance Act in July 1914, a 
smaller number than that estimated above for the union schemes. 
One final point should be emphasised: that such insurance was, prior to the state 
scheme, almost unique to the unions.  Although the unions were much less important than 
the friendly societies in the provision of sick pay, the latter took only limited interest in 
unemployment:  in 1891, the Hearts of Oak society provided only for remission of 
contributions while out of work; the Manchester Union of Oddfellows and the Ancient 
Order of Foresters operated a limited travelling scheme.  Other friendly societies made 
similar provision but the amounts spent were very small.  The Board of Trade told the 
1893 Select Committee on Distress that the only non-trade society known in 1895 to offer 
unemployment insurance was the ‘Loughton Mutual Labour Aid Society’, of Essex, with 
under forty members.26 
3. The trials of life:  ill-health, old age, and unemployment 
Like modern social security, friendly society and trade union benefit schemes were 
centrally concerned with providing members with an income when they were unable to 
work.  Lump sum payments were provided on death, mainly to provide a funeral, and for 
disabling accidents, but neither was a major part of total expenditure in the major trade 
union schemes.  These had four dominant elements:  sick pay, superannuation, 
unemployment pay or ‘donation benefit’, and strike pay or ‘contingent benefit’.  In 
modern eyes these all appear quite distinct, but on more careful investigation all four 
interacted in complex ways which affected the operation of the schemes. 
Let us begin with sick pay, the most common of all friendly benefits.  The basis of 
entitlement was always an inability to work, and schemes commonly provided for 
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medical examinations where there was some doubt about a member’s condition.  Each 
branch usually had one or more sick stewards, whose job it was both to assist ill members 
and to check up on them, and a curfew was often imposed on sick members;  for example, 
the ASE required them to be at home between 8 p.m. and 6 a.m. in summer, and 6 p.m. 
and 6 a.m. in winter.27  In the case of the ASE, these procedures to limit fraud were 
elaborate and, from the minutes of the national executive, enforced.  However, the 
difference between sickpay and superannuation was unclear. 
Although today we take a set retirement age for granted, this was not a feature of early 
superannuation rules.  For example, the ASE’s 1864 rules granted superannuation to any 
member aged over fifty who had belonged for eighteen years ‘who through old age or 
infirmity, is unable to obtain the ordinary rate of wages’;  a superannuated member could 
no longer work in engineering but was free to earn what he could in another trade.  Figure 
2 (a) shows age-specific morbidity rates for one early artisan union, and makes clear the 
degree to which older members were more likely to claim sick benefit;  the contrast is 
even greater if we concentrate on long durations of sickness, men aged over sixty being 
eight times as likely to be sick for over six months in a year than those under thirty.28  
Therefore, a benefit society would inevitably find itself paying sick benefit for extended 
periods to its more elderly members, and the real effect of the ASE’s rule was to set a 
time limit on sick pay for younger members. 
If sick pay was of greatest benefit to the elderly and superannuation restricted to the 
sick, the distinction between sickness and unemployment is rather clearer.  Eligibility for 
unemployment pay required that you have been dismissed by your employer, while sick 
pay might require a medical examination and involved a curfew.  However, the sick could 
not expect their previous job back on recovery and so must be considered ‘unemployed’;  
much ill-health was linked to occupation;  and vulnerability to unemployment was linked 
to health.  One reason for basing sick funds on occupational groups was the incidence of 
occupational ill-health.  As a society of Liverpool plumbers put it in 1812: 
it is well known to medical professors that the trade of plumber is very 
pernicious and prejudicious to health ...29 
The London ironfounders in 1826 gave as one of their reasons for formation the fact that 
other sick clubs had refused them membership on the grounds of the unhealthiness of 
their trade.30 
Figure 2 (b) shows the degree to which the likelihood of unemployment varied by age-
group, and given that older men were likely to have closer relationships with their 
employer and be more necessary for training new workers, this pattern must reflect 
poorer health, reduced physical strength, and deteriorating eyesight;  and hence lower 
productivity.  It should be emphasised that most skilled work required both technical 
expertise and considerable physical strength, mechanisation of the production process 
even in engineering being limited until the 1890s.  An extreme example is iron-founding, 
where workers had to physically stir molten metal.  As a result, men were likely to be 
physically worn-out well before modern retirement ages. 
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Therefore, instead of three quite distinct states we have a blending of unemployment, 
sickness, and old age;  the larger share of benefit payments, however labelled, went to 
older men who had more intermittent incomes due to declining health.  Without further 
analysis of individual level data, we cannot tell whether they were more likely to lose 
their jobs in lay-offs than younger men, but it seems certain that if made unemployed they 
would find it much harder to find another job;  in other cases, they lost their jobs because 
ill-health prevented them from working.  Eventually, employment for such a man would 
become so intermittent that he would claim superannuation.  At different times he would 
be on the three different benefits, but there is one underlying process:  growing 
marginalisation in the labour market due to physical decrepitude. 
The final blurring is between all these benefits and ‘strike pay’.  For most of the post 
W.W.II period, industrial disputes have emphasised strikes for pay increases, but in the 
nineteenth century wage reductions were common and, as discussed in the next section, 
most stoppages resulted from union resistance to such reductions.  In the artisan trades, 
most workplaces were relatively small, and their was little formal bargaining between 
unions and employers.  Instead, the men might memorialise their employer for an 
increase, and quit if it was not granted, or the employer simply announce a reduction for 
all or some of the workforce.  The most vulnerable workers in this process were the 
elderly, who knew they would not easily find a new job, and therefore they were most 
likely to be the first to have their hourly rate cut.  Union benefit rules make it quite clear 
that a man whose pay was cut to below the local ‘standard rate’ decided by the union was 
entitled to claim unemployment benefit, just as if he had been dismissed.  So we have the 
elderly, infirm member claiming unemployment benefit because his wages have been cut.  
Does it matter how we classify him?  What matters is that the union’s benefit both gave 
him greater control over his own life and strengthened the union’s bargaining position.  
This point is further explored in the next section. 
4. Economic and social foundations of mutual insurance 
The two preceding sections have demonstrated a number of crucial points: 
Firstly, if we see the core of the Welfare State as non-penal income support, its most 
important immediate precursor was neither the Poor Law nor commercial insurance but 
mutual insurance.  These mutual schemes expanded rapidly, catered to a mass market, 
and experienced virtually no opposition from commercial insurance companies;  they 
faded away only when the state supplanted them.31  This is a striking contrast with the 
general history of mutual enterprise, which is one of idealistic failure or survival in tiny 
niches. 
Secondly, the boundaries between hardship through illness, old age and unemployment 
were much less clear than they seem today;  one might argue that the modern distinctions 
follow from the way modern welfare systems operate. 
Thirdly, provision against loss of work was solely the province of trade unions.  
Although coverage was initially restricted, all unions arguably aspired to provide benefits, 
and in the years immediately prior to the introduction of the state scheme coverage was 
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expanding rapidly;  so rapidly, indeed, that the state scheme appears more as an attempt 
to either pre-empt trade union provision or re-shape it to non-controversial ends than to 
cater for an un-met need. 
How can we explain these patterns?  This section argues that in insuring against loss of 
income mutual organisations had and have an unbeatable competitive advantage over 
commercial companies, and that trade-based mutual organisations were uniquely able to 
offer self-funding insurance against unemployment.  Further, welfare benefits reinforced 
the other activities of the unions, and hence there was arguably a symbiotic relationship 
between the conventional industrial goals of the unions and the benefit schemes.  The 
concluding section argues that much of this analysis holds true today. 
Almost any insurance scheme must deal with the problem of moral hazard, which 
should be distinguished from fraud.  Consider motor insurance:  we insure to reduce the 
unpleasant consequences for us of an accident, but being insured inevitably alters our 
behaviour as drivers.  Perhaps only a few of us are more likely to overtake on a blind 
corner just because we are insured, but how many more of us would stay home on a wet 
night if we knew we had no insurance?  This problem and others are far more severe in 
insuring against the loss of a future income stream.  The boundary between can’t work 
and won’t work is necessarily indistinct, and arguably a legitimate reason for insuring is 
to obtain a degree of discretion:  to stay home for a couple of days longer so as to make a 
full recovery;  to quit a job when conditions have become intolerable, and to find the best 
available new job rather than have to accept the first that comes along;  to take retirement 
rather than simply work until one is worn out;  but all these are of course matters of 
degree, and very hard for an outsider to judge.  Equally, a future income stream is far 
harder to value than the cost of repairing a car, and of course the potential for fraud much 
greater;  it is easy to imagine a commercial insurance company spending as much on 
private investigators as on disbursements, and any scheme must have such high 
transaction costs that the honest individual at average risk will have a strong incentive to 
stay away. 
A mutual scheme based on some locality or occupational group overcomes many of 
these problems.  The mechanism of the box club meant that all payments were very 
visibly a cost to the other members, and where clubs were based on both locality and 
affinity these other members would be those best placed to judge the legitimacy of a 
claim:  the reality of an affliction, the degree of loss, the strength of the victim’s efforts to 
find a new job.  Perhaps most crucial of all, the other members could judge from their 
own experience whether the decisions necessarily taken by the claimant were proper or an 
‘imposition on the funds’.  Too much discussion of social insurance is on the assumption 
that it is other people who claim, but the other members of the same box would be well 
aware that next month or next year they might find themselves in the same situation.  This 
is in striking contrast to the state scheme, where criticism in the media of ‘scroungers’ is 
arguably matched in popular culture by vilification of the ‘snooper’:  the containment of 
the effects of moral hazard, as distinct from out-and-out fraud, requires both sensitivity 
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and a degree of rough justice which uninvolved state or company bureaucrats can seldom 
combine. 
Mutuality was an advantage in managing the claims of those making greatest demands 
on the system.  It also made membership of schemes more attractive to low-risk 
individuals.  There are three aspects to this.  Firstly, all mutual organisations emphasised 
‘conviviality’:  payments and claims were made in person at monthly meetings which 
were social occasions, some clubs earmarked part of their income to buy drinks, and there 
were annual dinners, processions, and excursions.  Secondly, belonging to a trade union 
also granted significant advantages in the labour market:  although the closed shop was 
rare in pre-1914 Britain, union membership often signified that you were part of a well-
trained elite of reliable workers within your craft and the union helped you find work.  
Thirdly, the previous section showed that low-risk individuals were likely to be the 
younger members.  Consequently, non-trade friendly societies in the early nineteenth 
century frequently collapsed as their original members aged, finding it impossible to 
recruit new younger members as the benefit expenditure and hence subscription rose;  
more rarely, the younger members pushed out the older.32  Younger members of a union 
could look at this situation differently:  the more infirm older members were precisely 
those more likely to accept reduced wages if not otherwise provided for, and so in 
funding their benefits the younger members were helping sustain their own wage rates. 
Symbioses work two ways.  Anyone who has belonged to a club or society knows that 
however strong the social/alcoholic element any organisation needs ‘business’ to sustain 
itself, and justify attendance to wives.   Even trade unions needed routine business to 
maintain their structures, as industrial conflicts are infrequent and unions which had no 
other role tended to atrophy in peacetime.  However, the operation of welfare benefits had 
two other major attractions to industrial organisations.  Firstly, they provided a cash flow 
which could also be drawn on to fund strikes and lock-outs.  The extent of this was and is 
controversial, as critics of the unions saw them as subsidising conflict from sick funds 
and used this to justify legal controls on their finances.  Two points are clear, however:  
the major unions never earmarked parts of their incomes for different functions, hence it 
is hard to define cross-subsidy;  but expenditure on strike pay in the artisan unions was 
almost always small relative to other benefits.  The question of whether unemployment 
benefit was really disguised strike pay is far more complex than it first appears and is 
discussed below, but again the bulk of expenditure came in winter and during recessions, 
not during episodes of unrest. 
The second  way in which benefit funds strengthened the unions industrially is less 
discussed but arguably far more important.  In one crucial respect, union and other early 
mutual systems differed drastically from conventional insurance:  entitlement was based 
primarily on present membership, not past contributions, and the societies had no 
contractual obligation to provide any future benefits, still less a particular rate of benefit.  
Consequently, expulsion from the union meant the loss of all future benefits, regardless of 
how much had been paid in:  ‘any person rejoining ... shall occupy a position in all 
respects as if he had never been a member’.33  Expulsion was not arbitrary, and major 
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unions had elaborate appeals procedures, but there was no question that a member would 
lose his pension if he failed to strike or accepted reduced wages without showing good 
cause.  In the absence of the closed shop and with only a fraction of a craft in the union, 
this was an essential mechanism by which a union disciplined its membership and 
maintained itself as an effective economic coalition.  Note that those with most to lose 
from expulsion would have been precisely those older members who were most 
vulnerable in the labour market, and as they would be too old for re-admission the loss 
would be final. 
The discussion so far concerns all aspects of welfare benefits, but additional arguments 
apply to unemployment insurance.  Again, there are two sides to the hypothesised 
symbiosis.  Firstly, that until the state became involved only the unions could offer such a 
benefit.  Secondly, that the provision of unemployment benefit was a central element 
within the industrial strategy of the artisan unions. 
We have already seen that until 1911 it was only the unions that did offer 
unemployment benefit, and contemporary comments explain why.  Frederick Harrison in 
the Minority Report of the 1869 Royal Commission on Trade Unions34 stated: 
[Donation benefit and other assistance to members out of work] are forms of 
benevolent assurance which nothing but a trade union could afford.  It is plain that 
no friendly or other assurance society could guarantee working men support 
whilst out of employment, unless like a trade union it possessed some means of 
operating on the labour market.35 
Hubert Llewellyn Smith, the first Commissioner for Labour at the Board of Trade, wrote 
in an 1893 report on methods of relieving unemployment: 
The power of an organisation to assist the unemployed ... depends largely not 
only on the knowledge which it possesses of the conditions of each case and of the 
state of employment in each district, but on the completeness of the hold which it 
has over the individuals relieved.  A trade union which gives many forms of 
benefit to its members has this hold in the highest degree, since in extreme cases 
fraud or ‘malingering’ may be punished by expulsion.36 
The relevant parts of the 1911 National Insurance Act were drafted by Llewellyn 
Smith and Beveridge, both with intimate knowledge of the union schemes, and they saw 
the establishment of a network of employment exchanges as a pre-requisite for state 
unemployment insurance.37  In the proposal submitted to the Cabinet by the Board of 
Trade, Llewellyn Smith restated his earlier view: 
The experience of every unemployment insurance fund has shown that it is 
necessary, in order to protect the fund, to associate ... the scheme with the 
provision of some facilities for finding jobs for workmen in receipt of benefit.  
This is necessary in order to test the genuiness of certain cases by the offer of 
work.38 
In other words, to offer insurance against unemployment an organisation must possess 
a detailed knowledge of the labour market in which the insured individuals seek work and 
an ability to monitor their behaviour.  The costs of acquiring these are too great for them 
to be treated as incidental costs of operating unemployment insurance:  the organisation 
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must possess them for other reasons.  In practice, this limits the provision of 
unemployment insurance to three types of agency:  the state, which can fund anything 
from taxation and may have other reasons for intervening in the labour market;  coalitions 
of the employed, meaning trade unions;  and employers.  Individual employers will only 
be interested in securing individuals against unemployment if they have a long term 
commitment to those individuals.  This point is returned to in the conclusion, but what is 
certain is that in the pre-1914 period British employers preferred flexibility in hiring and 
firing to whatever advantages there were in a more permanent link to employees.  This 
meant that until the state took an interest the unions had a natural monopoly. 
The evidence for the dependency of unemployment insurance on unionism is 
overwhelming but the converse relationship is less obvious and the association weaker:  
all such insurance was provided by unions but not all unions made such provision.  Cost 
and moral hazard limited it to those well above average earnings while in other sectors 
fluctuations in the demand for labour were small, as in much of transport, or spread 
among the workforce by short-time working, as in mining.  However, for the artisan 
unions it was arguably a central pillar of unionism, and it was these who formed the great 
and, crucially, stable national unions of pre-1914 Britain. 
The central obstacle to the aims of unionism, particularly in investment industries, was 
the trade cycle.  Unions stood for the maintenance and advancement of wages and 
working conditions.  Among skilled men who retained some control over entry to their 
craft, ‘advances’ were relatively easily achieved during booms.  However, in subsequent 
depressions the downward pressure on wages was irresistible and, overall, the oscillations 
of demand interacted with the asymmetry of bargaining in a bi-laterally monopolistic 
labour market to place the unions at a disadvantage:  labour is a perishable commodity 
while capital, particularly variable capital, is not.  Hence, given the limited importance of 
fixed capital even in such industries as engineering, in the nineteenth century strikes were 
much costlier to their initiators than were lock-outs.  The monopoly is assumed but seems 
reasonable applied in the short run to single towns. 
This downward pressure on wages reflected not only opportunism by those employers 
still with work in hand but also a real decline in their capacity to pay.39  Hence demands 
for wage reductions could not be met simply by obduracy and solidarity.  Unions which 
held out against any reduction would see mass unemployment among their members 
while work was available at reduced rates, leading to a catastrophic loss of membership.40  
However, simple acceptance of a direct relationship between product prices and wages, 
formalised as a ‘sliding scale’,41 emasculated unionism;  it was particularly unacceptable 
to craft unions with members in a number of industries, since it denied the central 
principle of a standard rate.  It was therefore inevitable that unions would seek to provide 
for the cycle, as distinct from accepting it. 
The tramping system was an adequate response to the structural unemployment of the 
industrial revolution: rapid movements of industry and localised decline.  However it was 
inadequate in the face of general depression and was therefore replaced by unemployment 
pay, permitting union members to hold out for the standard rate in periods of depression.  
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In this way, by reducing their members' need for continuity of employment and, through 
sickness and superannuation benefits, creating an alternative reliance on the future 
strength of the society, the unions gave practical meaning to the mutuality of the moral 
economy. 
However, a union could also collapse through the exhaustion of its funds;  many early 
societies were ephemeral.  A union’s strategy to meet a depression involved three 
elements.  Firstly, a rate of benefit sufficient for its purpose but discouraging malingerers;  
this usually meant a tapering-off as the duration of a man's unemployment lengthened.  
Secondly, a rate of contribution:  the early societies often made do with one shilling per 
month and collapsed in slumps, but the ASE and its imitators charged this sum per week.  
Lastly, and clearly related, was wage policy:  the aim of the union was maximisation of 
members’ wages subject to the union itself staying solvent, since an exhaustion of funds 
through expenditure on unemployment benefit would mean a collapse of industrial power 
and a rout in the face of wage cuts.  As a result, they did their best to maintain earlier 
increases in wages;  William Allan of the ASE told the 1867 Royal Commission that the 
majority of strikes during the previous ten years had been against reductions, and only six 
at most for increases:  ‘we keep what we can get, as a general rule’.42  However, large 
reductions in standard wages had to be accepted in depressions but only as strategic 
withdrawals in the course of a long advance.  The implication is clear:  the operation of 
unemployment insurance was intimately involved with processes of collective bargaining. 
In public union leaders stressed the ‘respectability’ of their benefit activities and in 
union circulars discussed them only when urging restraint in expenditure.  However, a 
detailed examination of that most respectable of artisan unions, the ASE, shows that its 
Executive Committee actively encouraged branches to seek wage increases during booms 
by giving prior authorisation for men losing their jobs to get unemployment pay, while in 
recessions the Executive discouraged such local initiatives by pointing to the state of the 
labour market and the funds.43  Further, the unions expressed considerable reservations 
over the 1911 National Insurance Act;  the 1909 Trades Union Congress resolved that: 
No system of Labour Exchanges or compulsory State insurance for want of 
employment will be accepted by the organised workers unless the Trade Unions 
of the country have adequate representation in the management. And that the 
Trade Unions shall be the channel through which the financial arrangements 
between the workers and the State shall be transacted.44 
Their concern centred on the conditions under which the unemployed might legally refuse 
work and retain state benefits.  Where the unions treated their ‘standard rates’ as 
permissible minima, the Board of Trade used the ‘previous wage rate’ of the individual 
claimant, and the whole topic was a constant source of friction.45 
5. Conclusion:  welfare provision without the state 
This paper has argued that the problem of moral hazard — the ways in which 
individual behaviour is modified by the provision of insurance — has such a large impact 
on the operation of unemployment insurance, and to a lesser extent sick pay, as to make it 
impossible for a commercial organisation to offer such cover.  This is mainly the 
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consequence not of the level of profit or subsidy required — early mutual schemes broke 
even and financed considerable expenditure on beer — but of the division between 
insurers and insured.  This absence of commercial unemployment insurance was true then 
and remains true today;  the one exception, at least in Britain, is insurance of mortgage 
payments but this is a very special case, as taking out the insurance is often a condition 
for obtaining the mortgage and any disbursements go not to the insured person but direct 
to the lender.46 
Regrettably, discussion of both the history and the future of welfare has ignored 
changes in the labour market, even though Britain’s welfare system has always been 
centrally concerned with replacing lost income.  In 19th century Britain, people turned to 
mutual organisations because relationships with employers were weak and transitory, but 
for most of the 20th century the expectation has been that workers remain with the same 
employer for many years:  ‘good’ employers, notably the state and large corporations, 
sought to provide lifetime employment as well as pensions.  For many this system of 
secure employment has been the true welfare state,  and state benefits have come to be 
seen as transfer payments to an underclass. 
Today, however, secure employment is harder to find:  the state privatises and 
contracts out, transferring workers to the private sector;  large corporations such as IBM 
and General Motors ‘down-size’ and dismiss tens or even hundreds of thousands of 
workers.  New employment is being created, but it is in small firms and often part-time or 
freelance.  workers must frequently find new employers and will be without work for 
significant periods, which are likely to become more frequent as they become older and 
find it harder to learn new skills:  unemployment is already high among workers aged 55-
65.  In this new world, individuals will still seek the security which their employers no 
longer provide.  Discovering that the state has withdrawn from providing assistance to the 
middle mass of society, and that commercial insurance has little to offer, where will they 
turn?  Is it possible that we will see a revival of trade union provision, or some new 
system of mutuality? 
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